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Conclusion
THE NEED FOR INTERNATIONAL LAW
James C.N. Paul
After reviewing at length Uganda's "violent and bloody history" of
"flagrant abuse of human rights" by successive despotic regimes, a
specially constituted Commission of Inquiry recommended major
reforms in the future structure and governance of that country's ISFs. l
The reforms proposed were envisioned as an integral part of a
broader effort to reconsitute the Ugandan state. The basic objective
stressed was the need to put all security forces under a new rule of law.
To that end the mission, organizational structure and management of
each force should be elaborated in carefully crafted legislation.
Further, the plenary, powers of the legislature to monitor, regulate,
abolish and reorganize all ISFs should be confirmed. The "internal
security" role of the army should be limited to the pacification of
"insurgency or rebellion." The basic obligation of all security forces
to protect and promote "the constitution, human rights and
humanitarian law" should be made clear - and confirmed by a solemn,
personal commitment of all members of these forces.
A number of other recommendations - dealing with such subjects
as recruitment, gender and ethnic composition, training, codes of
conduct, systems of discipline and the accountability of all levels of
the force, oversight, and the power of civil societies to monitor ISFs
and take appropriate action to prevent and resist human rights
violations - paralleled those proposed by the Code of Universal
Principles (to govern ISFs) set out elsewhere in this volume.
More recently, across the continent, Olusegun Obasanjo, in his
inaugural address as Nigeria's newly elected president, reviewed the
"bleak, very bleak indeed" social condition of that country. The
incursion of the military into government "has been a disaster," he
said, and "a great deal of reorientation has to be undertaken,"
1 The "Recommendations" (Chapter 13) of the "Report" of the "Ugandan Commission of Inquiry
Into the Violations of Human Rights" were recently published in 3 EAST AFRICAN J. OF PEACE AND
HUMAN RIGHTS 140 (1996).
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including "a redefinition of the roles [and] retraining and re-
education."
2
The challenges of reconstruction confronting Nigeria and Uganda
are illustrative of a broader regional crisis which has been analyzed in
a notable Report to the UN Security Council (on "The Current
Situation in Africa") by Kofi Anan. 3 That document bluntly attributes
the growth of internal conflicts, humanitarian catastrophes, worsening
poverty and environmental degradation to the failure of states.
Indeed, "failed states" have now become a focus of much scholarly
literature.4 States fail when the ruling regime no longer meets the
minimal, legitimate expectations of their people. In these states the
existing constitutional order has, in effect, been embezzled by
predatory elites and ISFs, and governance has been converted into a
despotic system increasingly geared to private gain or other illegal
purposes. Some of these regimes have inflicted - or tolerated infliction
of - international crimes upon their peoples. They have also produced
internal conflicts which, in turn, have led to equally lawless
insurgencies, and sometimes the phenomenon of "warlord"
organizations which, living through plunder, take over the governance
of whole regions of the state.5
Starting with a discussion of colonial and other historical legacies,
the Secretary General's Report offers explanations for state failures.
The Report notes themes more fully treated in the now voluminous
scholarly literature on this subject. These include: the pathologies of
the basic institutions of governance, and of competitive politics (e.g.
parties, electoral contests and institutions); the opportunity and
temptations to use the state's power over the economy for private
purposes and, in that context, the tendency of political elites to equate
"democracy" with a form of "majority rule" which, in effect, licenses
the suppression of opposition; and the inherent weaknesses of civil
society and the temptations of governing regimes to divide and
disempower it.
2 See Excerpt from President Obsanjo's February 27, 1999 Address, 10 J. OF DEMOCRACY No. 3,
1985-86 (1999).
3 See A/52/871-5/1998/318 (April 13, 1998).
4 See e.g., L.A. VILLALON AND P.A. HUXTABLE (EDS.) THE AFRICAN STATE AT A CRITICAL
JUNCTURE: BETWEEN DISINTEGRATION AND RECONSTRUCTION (1998).
5 See WILLIAM RENO, WARLORD POLITICS AND AFRICAN POLITICS (1998).
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These and other themes suggest that, from their colonial origins
onwards, states (viewed as systems of governance) have not only been
quite authoritarian, but extraordinarily autonomous from the citizens
they are supposed to serve: there is no organic unity between them.
Kofi Anan's Report - and the scholarly literature - suggest that the
crisis confronting Africa - notably the crisis confronting so many
disempowered and increasingly impoverished peoples of that region -
is, first and foremost, political in nature. Unless states can be
reconstructed to establish modes of governance which provide for
more mutually beneficial interactions and relationships with people,
attempts to rehabilitate economies will lack sustainability.
Towards that end - reconstituting states so that they exist for the
purpose of serving people instead of ruling them, the Secretary.
General's Report emphasizes three interrelated themes as both goals
and the means of governance of states.
The first of these is "human development" - a term of art, a holistic
concept which, taken seriously, requires a profound rethinking of the
functions, structure and governance of basic organs of the state, and
the creation of new institutions and processes of governance. Human
development envisions the capacitation and empowerment of civil
society as an essential element of poverty alleviation, delivery of basic
services, attention to women's roles and needs, rehabilitation of
environments and other community - and people - centered goals.
Human development, taken seriously requires basic reforms and
innovations enabling new forms of participation, as well as new
standards of transparency and accountability at all levels of
governance. Human development calls for the incorporation of human
rights of all categories into the design and management of
governmental activities - notably those which directly impact on
people. Many specific constitutional and other legal reforms are
clearly necessary to enable these fundamental changes in the concept
and primary functions of the state and the ways in which it governs.
6
Such changes would seem to be essential if the vast groups between
6 See Note 28, in this author's "introduction" to this volume. For a detailed elaboration of the
constitutional and legal reforms necessary to implement "human development" objectives, see James Paul
and Clarence Dias, Incorporating Human Rights into Human Development Strategies (International
Center for Law in Development 1999).
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peoples and their states is to be closed - if states and civil societies are
to exist as organic units.
"Democratization" and the progressive entrenchment are,
obviously, complementary to the goal of human development; indeed
these terms take on a new meaning, especially relevant to the crisis of
state failure, when they are integrated to development imperatives.
Kofi Anan's Report on this crisis elaborates reasons why the
International Community - operating through the UN system and other
intergovernmental organizations (e.g. the World Bank) and through
non-governmental coalitions - must be mobilized to aid this
transformation of states.
International law can, obviously, be used to pursue this goal. The
Charter of the United Nations requires that organization to promote
peace, development (notably human development) and the progressive
"realization of universal human rights" as interdependent goals, and
the steady expansion of international law is clearly envisioned as one
means to pursue them.7 Despite the many failures and weaknesses in
the UN system, it remains important to appreciate just how far earlier
notions of state sovereignty have now been modified by the
establishment of constitutional standards of governance which all
states must respect through their legal orders and political systems.
Within the past decade a new International Law of Development
(ILD) has been established which complements International Human
Rights Law and also impacts on the constitutional ordering of states.
The ILD clearly calls for a new, more holistic concept of human
development whereby poverty-alleviation, sustainability, participation,
human rights, and democratized and good governance are seen as
essential, integrated, interdependent tasks of the state. The ILD calls
(in the words of "Commitment No. 1" of the Copenhagen Summit) for
the creation of an "environment" of "law" and "administration" which
will "enable" realization of these goals. It reflects a significant
evolution in international law from a focus on setting standards to a
focus on their implementation, from elaboration of rights to
elaboration of institutional and processual reforms necessary to
7 On this point see Boutros Boutros-Ghali, The United Nations Family: Challenges of Law and
Development, 36 HARVARD INT'L LAw JouRNAL 267 (1995) ("peace," development," "human rights" and
"international law" are the "four cornerstones" of the Charter").
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promote and protect rights. The ILD calls for new structures enabling
devolution of powers of governance to the lowest possible levels in
order to enable self-determined, participatory development; it calls for
participatory institutions and processes to assess the "human rights and
social impacts" of programs and monitor the progressive realization of
all rights through development and through the provision of all
essential services including "security." The ILD calls for processes to
assure public access to, and transparency, disclosure and "due process
in the administration of all spheres of governance including"security").
It calls for measures and institutions to provide codes of conduct and
human rights training for officials, and it calls for processes to promote
functional civic education and rights awareness.
8
These new international norms reflect the fact that institutional
reform and innovation is the new frontier of both international
development and international human rights law. Thus, within recent
years, there has been renewed attention on the development of Human
Rights Commissions as basic organs of government. Striking, too, has
been the development of universal principles to govern the structure,
operations and powers, independent courts, legal professions and the
prosecutorial organs - reforms which are seen as essential to
implement the obligation of governments to establish independent
institutions to enforce human rights. The reforms required by these
international instruments and by the UN Code of Conduct for all law
enforcement agencies have been repeatedly reaffirmed by the General
Assembly; they are now said to be "essential" to the "processes of
democracy and sustainable development." 9
Quite recently the UN Commission on Human Rights adopted a
resolution on the "Promotion of the Right to Democracy." It, too,
reaffirmed the centrality of the "rule of law," and "independence of the
judiciary" and "transparent and accountable government institutions"
as core elements of the "rights of [all people to] democratic
governance," and it called for an expansion of [UN system] activities"
s See James C.N. Paul, The United Nations and The Creation of an International Law of
Development, 36 HARVARD INT'L LAW J. 307 (1995).
See e.g., "Human Rights in the Administration of Justice, A/Res/48/137, March 4, 1994. This
Resolution cites and reaffirms the universality of the instruments discussed above. These instruments are
collected in a volume, COMPENDIUM OF UNITED NATIONS STANDARDS AND NORMS IN CRIME
PREVENTION AND JUSTICE (United Nations Centre For Social Development and Humanitarian Affairs
1992).
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to develop "appropriate measures" to support "democratic
governance" in all states.1
0
Pressuring and using the UN system to establish a code of
universal principles to govern ISFs is surely a project deserving the
attention of coalitions of human rights NGOs. Indeed, without
concerted efforts by international civil society, it is doubtful that such
a code could be brought into existence, and, conversely, as recent
experience shows (e.g. the Convention on land mines), the
mobilization of international pressure can now be a powerful force to
create new international instruments.
Of course, adoption of such a code would create only a
"soft"species of international law. But all international human rights
law is essentially horatory. It gains force to the extent its existence is
consistently reaffirmed by the international community, and as it is
used by progressive states, international organizations and aggressive
coalitions of civil society groups, to press and shame governments.
In Africa, the case for a universal code should be put in the larger
context of the effort to promote the reconstitution of states and
implementation of transitions to democracy. The existence of a
publicized international instrument on the governance of ISFs would
call attention to this sadly neglected, but critically important task of
constitutional ordering. It would help change the terms of debate by,
in effect, calling upon governments to justify their failure to subscribe
to principles now internationally prescribed. An international code of
principles would provide a carefully considered blueprint for reform of
constitutions and legal systems - reforms which are indeed necessary
to implement the Covenants, the Womens Convention and a number of
other rights instruments. 1 It would legitimate popular demands for
action, and the application of pressure by UN agencies and other
international organizations.
The case for reform of ISFs seems compelling, not only in light of
past experience, but in the context of promoting democratization and
human development. The positive roles which ISFs must play to
promote realization of these goals deserves more emphasis.
"o This Resolution on "Promotion of the Right to Democracy" was adopted by a vote of 51-0 (Cuba
and China abstaining ) on April 27, 1999. Its text is reprinted in 10 J. oF DEMOCRAcY 182 (No. 3) 1999.
" See the discussion of these points in my paper on Ethiopia in this volume.
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Commentators have pointed out that many parts of Africa are now
awash with weapons; controlling the flow of arms, and their use by
insurgent groups and criminal elements, presents a difficult task, and
much may depend on the ability of governments to establish
conditions of personal security by establishing new relations of trust
and confidence with communities.12
Just as the creation of despotic governments has led to new forms
of communal violence and depressing poverty among communities, so
it has led, apparently in many countries, to the growth of violent crime;
and, where the security of persons and property deteriorates, so do the
conditions for human development and democratization.
As papers in this volume show, from colonial times onward
African ISFs have not been notably effective as protectors of ordinary
people from crime. The security of the ruling regime - rather than the
security needs of civil society - has been seen as their fundamental
mission, and brutal or lawless methods of enforcement hve so often
been prevalent. Incompetence in controlling crime is exacerbated
when police and civil society are estranged and mutually mistrustful.
Therefore, the commentators have emphasized, the need for a wholly
new model of the essential functions and methods of policing, and
police-civil society relations.'
3
So, too, the processes of democratization require new functions for
law enforcement. ISFs, must play critical roles to assure the integrity
of electoral processes, and to protect peaceful public assemblies and
other modes of organized, popular participation. If new methods of
peaceful crowd control are to be employed, fundamental changes in
the conception of the essential mission of ISFs, as well as new kinds of
operational training, must be put in place. A new approach would also
sem necessary to address the problems of institutionalized corruption.
12 A subject discussed in the Secretary General's Report to the Security Council supra note 3. See
also Stephanie Neuman, Arms Trade, Military Assistance and Recent Wars, 541 ANNALS 47 (1995). "In
Uganda AK-47s are so plentiful they can be obtained for the price of a chicken." Id. at 67.
13 See, e.g. E. A. Brett, Neutralizing the Use of Force in Uganda: The Role of the Military in
Politics, 33 J. OF MODERN AFRICAN STUDIES, 129 (1995); Chris Alden, "The UN and the Resolution of
Conflict in Mozambique," id at 103; Jakkie Ciliers, Security and Transition in South Africa, 6 J. OF
DEMOCRACY 35 (1995) all discussing the crucial roles of the police in the reconstruction of these states.
E.A. Brett, supra and Alice Hills (in Towards a Critique of Policing and National Development in Africa,
34 J. OF MODERN AFRICAN STUDIES 271 (1996)).
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In many countries, if reports in this volume are indicative, the
police and military are regarded more as enemies than as servants of
the people. This deplorable condition, the Uganda Commission noted,
not only creates public alienation, but police ineffectiveness. In the
struggle to establish a new political culture of enhanced participation,
tolerance, respect for rights and confidence in law, the ISFs, especially
those assigned regular law enforcement tasks, must seek to become
positive forces - practicing civility, transparency and scrupulous
respect for codes of conduct designed to protect rights. This is always
a difficult, but surely not impossible task: the political as well as
military success of insurgent "liberation" forces in Ethiopia, Eritrea
and (to some extent at least) Uganda were built on the forging of new
relationships of respect between those forces and the peoples of
liberated territories - on adherence to strict codes of conduct imposed
on soldiers and mobilization of public participation in the tasks of
local policing. A general in Ethiopia's liberation army has publicly
recorded in his view that these policies must be carried over into
policing by the post-liberation regime within the military if a civic
culture favorable to democracy and the rule of law are to take root.14
Thus ISFs, by the very nature of their contacts with people,
exercise profound educational and political roles in shaping the
character of the state and its relationships to civil society. If "human
development," democratized governance and respect for rights are to
define the purposes of that relationship, the governance of ISFs can no
longer be entrusted to the discretion of the executive and his and his
subordinates, or simply to more professionalization of the officer
corps. It must be rooted in and controlled by law derived from, and
designed to implement, international human rights law.15
14 Tsadkin Gebre Tensae, "A Vision of a New Army in Ethiopia" a paper presented at the
Symposium on the Making of the New Ethiopian Constitution" sponsored by the Inter-Africa Group, May
17-21. 1993. See also E.A. Brett, supra note 13.
1S This paper has not argued the case for developing a uiversal code in the context of other regions
of the world, but surely that subject deserves consideration. Cf. Zoltan Barany, Controlling the Military:
A Partial Success, 10 J. OF DEMOCRACY No. 2 54 (1999), suggesting that "the Russian military remains a
large, uncontrolled, unreformed and improbably poor institution responsible for guarding 10,000 nuclear
warheads. In many respects this scenario is a textbook case for a military coup."
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